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Symposium on Federal Government
Simplification Experiences
Simplification- A Civil Procedure
Perspective
Doug Rendleman*
I. We know the way to simplification.
A lot of people, including Professor Neil Cohen, Mr. Martin
Dunn, Mr. Mike Greenwald, Judge Robert Keeton, Ms. Annetta
Cheek, Mr. Peter Goodloe, Professor Carol Mooney, Mr. Bryan
Garner' and the late Professor David Mellinkoff, have told us,
correctly and repeatedly, what tools to use to write better: be
consistent with terms, avoid unnecessary jargon, keep sentences
short, use active verbs and present tense with singular nouns, put
the rule first, the exception last, and garnish liberally with headings.
Finally, there is no good writing, only good rewriting. These are
not difficult ideas. Yet complexity and confusion keep coming
back. Why?
II. Where is simplification on the hierarchy of nettlesome
problems?
Complexity and the confusion complexity creates, although
annoying, expensive and inefficient, are never a legal system's worst
problems. A dynamic and pluralistic society will not pause long
enough to agree on many single meanings. The major issues for
legislatures and common law courts grow out of how to adopt the
last generation's law to the culture that exists now and will exist in
the future.
* Professor, Washington & Lee University.
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As we begin the new century, the engines of legal change are
the rise of computer technology and the decline of national
boundaries. The computer has not merely obliterated political
boundaries. Just as the Internet alters the way we communicate
and trade, e-mail transforms the way we think and write. As global
markets and international trade have advanced, the possibility of a
single "simple" vocabulary has receded.
III. Are all kinds of law equally amenable to simplification?
Even within one political entity, different kinds of law have
different kinds of rules. Commentators on the Uniform
Commercial Code have noted the difference between, on the one
hand, open-textured Article Two for sales, which states principles
and standards, leaving discretion to parties and factfinders and, on
the other hand, rule-bound Article Nine for secured transactions,
which recites positive law in rules intended to prescribe outcomes.1
The different types of law call for different skills, both to draft and
to administer. Sales and secured transactions will always be
difficult; but they will be difficult in different ways.
IV. Will "progress" always leave anachronism needing
clarification in its wake?
At any given time, a lot of law qualifies for simplification
because its vocabulary and analysis lags a generation or more
behind the times. The American Law Institute's restatements,
among other things, fill this gap. An example in remedies, one of
the subjects I teach, is restitution. A Restatement of Restitution
was completed in the 1930s, but, while it unifies restitution under
the head of unjust enrichment, this restatement is written in a
vocabulary modern lawyers do not understand and is based on a
dual system of law and equity now almost forgotten. The late
George Palmer's 1978 four-volume treatise on restitution is a
monument-or perhaps a tombstone; for Professor Palmer, not
suffering fools, wrote a work which, reflecting an earlier epoch, is
formidable even for professors who specialize in remedies.
Restitution is now undergoing restatement, and the legal profession
is entitled to anticipate that Professor and Reporter Andrew Kull's
1. Thomas Jackson and Ellen Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for
Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907, 908-09 (1978).
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erudition and clear language will restore restitution to an accessible
place beside contracts, property, and torts in the common law.2
V. Does procedure exhibit cycles?
In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore suggested that
classical periods when law is "neat, tidy and logical" and codified
alternate with romantic periods when detailed rules are out of
fashion.3 Professor Linda Mullinex of the Texas Law School
presented a paper which demonstrated how Gilmore's analysis of
commercial law applies to procedure.4
Procedural rules, Professor Mullinex said, have a dialectic.
They start out simple because everyone likes simple rules.
Thinking we have wise judges and, confident they will decide
correctly, the rulemakers have granted judges broad discretion.
Many of the challenges in contemporary procedure result from
these short, simple, discretion-creating rules. Lawyers and judges
deal with new problems in new ways. How do we distinguish a new
doctrine from a discrete exercise of discretion? When lawyers feel
aggrieved, the rule, they argue, has developed exceptions and
become complicated. As nuance is embroidered on the fringes of
discretion, the rules, but particularly the decisions analyzing the
rules, grow lengthier and more complex. The formerly simple rules
evolve into a labyrinth complete with traps for the unwary.
Another group of wise sages rises up and decides to start all over
again with simpler, better-drafted rules. Complexity follows
unadorned rules and the tendency toward complexity creates, in
turn, the urge to reform and simplify-leading in turn to more
complexity.
An example of the dialectic begins in the nineteenth century
with horrendously complex "common law" pleading. Reformers
intended the simplified code pleading in the nineteenth century to
supplant the excessively technical common law forms of action.
Then in the twentieth century, after code pleading became in its
turn too cumbersome, procedure specialists developed notice
pleading under the federal rules with their hallmark "one form of
civil action." Professor Mullinex closed this part of her piece with a
clever pun, She asked, "Where are we now in the dialectic of
complexity and simplification?" Has procedure become sufficiently
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 1, (2001)).
3. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 102 (1974).




intricate that a new age of reform will dawn with the twenty-first
century? Will proceduralists experiment with trans-substantive
rules and return to substance-based procedure? Or may we
anticipate "one form of simple action?"
VI. Can simplification avoid context?
Reformers, even if they have a fresh start, can never simplify
context. We have inherited in two of the foundation words in
procedure, jurisdiction and equity, multiple, even inconsistent
meanings. In the generation before mine, Professor Zechariah
Chafee showed in his Cooley lectures and book Some Problems of
Equity how several meanings of "jurisdiction," particularly
confusion between the concepts of equity jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction, have led courts into error that may have been
inadvertent! Another author enumerated seven different senses in
which legal writers use the word "equity" without reaching the
hinge on which the Seventh Amendment's constitutional right to a
jury trial turns-the primary distinction between legal-common law
remedies and equity-chancery remedies.6
In addition to chameleons that change meanings with context,
other legal subjects feature synonyms which create the vocabulary
surplus Garner refers to as "needless variants." Restitution, as I
mentioned above, is undergoing long-needed restatement, where a
major problem will be how to simplify the plethora of terms legal
writers use to describe the plaintiff's restitution action to recover a
money judgment. The general terms are general assumpsit,
indebitatus assumpsit, quasi-contract, and contract implied in law;
all are spongy words which confuse the uninitiated by sending a
false signal to connect unjust enrichment-restitution with a
bargained contract.
VII. Are document simplifiers potentially prey to literalism?
Although plain English lacks a timeless originalist base in
which to discover the authentic meaning, an equivalent to prescient
Framers and a static Constitution, simplifying law is vulnerable to
excesses of literalism. As I am using the word here, literalism is the
idea that a pure unambiguous language exists which transcends
5. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (Thomas M. Cooley Lectures
1950).
6. Newman, The Place and Function of Pure Equity in the Structure of Law,
16 HASTINGS L.J. 401, 402-03 (1965).
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time and context and admits no deviance. Lacking a sense of
nuance, literalism rejects ambiguity.
Legal language which ultimately expresses governmental
power almost always requires interpretation. The meaning of
important terms is open, porous, permeable, and changing. The
language of a legal rule, a legal realist would say, has play in the
joints. Lawyers learn in law school to accept, even exploit, process
and uncertainty. Legal language on this plane is primarily a
technique of analysis, rhetoric, and argument about how to use the
political process, including a judge and a jury, to determine who
gets what, where, when and how.
Literalism, if it attempts to control meaning and manage
discourse, neglects the reality that law is a dialogue, usually leading
to an exercise of judgment.
VIII. Is simplification sexy?
Simplification is preventive law. Clear thinking followed by
clear writing creates the statute or the contract that works, the will
that sends the property to the intended destination, and the jury
instruction that facilitates the correct decision. These finales are
not exciting, indeed they are even dull, for nothing singular has
happened. Crisis is thrilling. Lawyers like the exhilaration of
procedure, litigation, and, most of all, trials. The trial lawyer is the
person in our business with name recognition. The clear writing
maven resembles the public health doctor who after preventing an
epidemic observes a surgeon basking in public acclaim and
accolades after performing a novel transplant.
IX. What is in simplification for me? Or, where is mine?
Where is simplification's payoff? Legal writing instructors
enjoy low, if any, professional prestige. Law school champions of
plain English have not, on the strength of their advocacy, received
offers from more prestigious universities, large salary raises,
consultant fees, and professional celebrity. I suspect the writing
specialist receives a similar reception from substantive specialists in
law firms and government agencies. Satisfaction with a job well
done, yes, but wealth and fame, no.
X. Will universal approbation greet simplification?
Part of the profession's inertia stems from the discomforting
message the writing nag communicates. People resist change.
Substantive proficiency is not drafting proficiency. Simplifying
2001]
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something a specialist thinks is already substantively finished is
difficult and time-consuming. It takes introspection to accept the
need for change, effort to transform turgid prose, and time to
rewrite it. The simplifier walks the land of thin shoes and tender
toes.
Under our legal system of winner take all, complexity which
creates uncertainty means that legal talent, always in short supply,
commands even more of a premium. Savvy, specialist lawyers who
have mastered complexity and learned to live with process and
uncertainty develop a vested intellectual interest in complexity and
they too lack any genuine incentive for reform.
XI. Conclusion.
Sure we should work assiduously toward a single set of
guidelines or principles. Internationalization, globalization, digit-
alism, inevitable context, the desire to prepare for every
contingency, and even human cussedness all militate against a
golden future age of plain and simple law. Professor Carol Mooney
reminded us it took seven years to simplify something as specialized
and ostensibly straightforward as the rules of appellate procedure.
Simplification is going to be with us for a long time.
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